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Panic Behavior and the Performance of Circuit Breakers: Empirical Evidence
Abstract
The study examines the behavior of a small stock market with círcuít
breakers and with a one-hour pre-auction order lmbalance disclosure, during
the October 1987 crash. The crash and its aftershocks lasted for a week and
sellíng pressure was concentrated in hígher beta, larger capítalízation, and
lower leverage fírm stocks. Circuít breakers when implemented reduced the
next-day opening order imbalance and the initíal price loss; however, they
had no effect on the long-run response. Some price overreaction and reversal
phenomena also are documented.
Introductíon
The October 1987 crash was the most prominent recent example of panic
in stock markets.l The crash was worldwide. Roll (1988) notes that: "All
ma~or world markets declíned substantially in October 1987 - an exceptional
occurrence given the usual modest correlatíons of returns across countries.
Of 23 markets, 19 declined by more than 20'I.."
Following the crash, the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms
(the Brady Commission) recommended that: "Circuit breaker mechanisms (such
as price límits and coordinated trading haits) should be formulated and
ímplemented to protect the market system (1988, p. 130)." The commissíon's
hope was that círcuit breakers followed by orderly re-opening procedures
would dampen the enormous íntraday volatility of prices characteristíc of
crash days, and would enable the stock exchanges to execute the public's
orders more efficiently (see Greenwald and Steín (1988)).
There ís líttle unanímíty on the issue of circuít breakers. Given their
obvious cost -- interfering wíth market líquidíty -- the effectiveness of
circuit breakers needs to be more clearly demonstrated. Previous empirical2
research such as Roll (1989), and Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989) present some
ínteresting observations on the issue. Further evldence, based on the unique
experíence of the Israelí stock market duríng the October 1987 crash, is
provided hereafter.
There are three main contributlons in examíning Israeli data. Fírst, on
the crash day of 1987, the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange implemented circuit
breakers selectively: not all Israeli stocks had trade halts because of
límit movements; about a third of the stocks managed to trade. Thís
círcumstance enables a controlled examination of the effect that circuit
breakers have. In fact, some of the stocks had more than one auctíon on the
crash day. Hence, the "trading on crash day" varíable becomes multi-level
and richer in ímplícatíons.
Second, during the crash períod the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange announced
order imbalance for each stock an hour before trade started, and imbalance
offsettíng orders uere receíved untíl the auction itself. This procedure of
an open períod before trade when publíc and traders can submit offsetting
orders ís akin to the trading mechanism that Greenwald and Stein (1991)
recommended to deal with panic sítuatíons. It ís ínterestíng to examine
Whether or not paníc and overreactíon occur ín such a controlled
envíronment.
Finally, there is the data advantage. The Tel Avív Stock Exchange
(TASE) publishes daily initial (pre-auction) order imbalances for each
stock. We therefore have accurate order ímbalance measures of a kind not
available ín prevíous research (see Blume, MacKínlay, and Terker (1989), for
example). The accuracy of these data increases the reliabilíty of the
analysis and allows an exploratory investigation of the determinants of
order imbalance in paníc situations. Thís is the fírst study to examine
explicit order imbalance data, and ít is arguable that the results of such
an analysis are more revealíng than príce response analysis alone.3
I. Research Issues
A. Paníc Behavior
Ben-Zion, Gutman, Egbe, and Brahams (1990) have studíed the relative
trading volumes of SB~P 500 stocks during the October 1987 crash. Trading
volumes increased especially for smaller-capitalízation stocks, higher-risk
stocks, and stocks that had gained the most from January through September
of 1987. To the extent that trading volumes duríng the crash are índicators
of supply pressures, this evídence suggests that ínvestors attempted to sell
the more uncertaín and less established stocks.
The present study contributes to panic-behavíor description by
examíning explícít and highly accurate order imbalance data. We construct a
measure of the crash-day relatlve order imbalance, defined as the order
ímbalance of the stock on crash day divided by the normal level of absolute
imbalance in the stock. This measure indicates whích stocks are
disproportionately dumped during a panic, information which could hint at
reasons behind a panic and reveal major concerns of investors at the time.
B. Circuit Breakers
Crashes are also characterized by an unusual intraday price volatility.
The large príce swings occurring within mínutes create seríous informatíon
asymmetry problems between floor traders and the public. Most investors can
no longer be sure about the order execution price; hence they may refrain
from tradíng altogether. Consequently, príces become even more chaotíc. A
trade halt could put an end to this vicious circle by giving investors a
chance to reassess the círcumstances, get information about the order
imbalances, and organíze liquidity for their trading plans. In short, trade
halts followed by an orderly "open" procedure should restore the
informativeness of and confidence in market prices (see Greenwald and Stein
(1988, 1991)).4
Despite the logic behínd circuit breakers, empirical studíes on their
actual effects have been scarce. Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989) examine the
impact of hittíng price limits on the return and volume behavior of four
future contracts (Treasury bonds, silver, corn, and soybeans). They find
that following a limit move: 1) prices tend to stabílíze or even reverse
direction, 2) the volatility of príces decreases, and 3) volume of trade
remains unchanged. Ma, Rao, and Sears' general impression ís that price
límits serve a positive role, ín that they cool off market reaction without
ímposing any substantial cost.
Stock príce evidence on the performance of circuit breakers is scant,
and the results appear mixed. In a comparatíve study of the October 1987
declínes of 23 major stock markets in the world, Roll (1988) finds that
price limits have no significant impact on the declíne. Bertero and 14ayer
using daily data for the same 23 markets as Roll, conclude by contrast that:
"Markets that had circuit breakers in operatíon on average decline by 7'I. and
9'I. (dependíng on the period) less than those that did not (1990, p. 1167)."
While there may be ways to explaín the díscrepencies in evidence (Roll
and Bertero and Mayer use dífferent explanatory variables and dífferent
return windows - see Roll (1989) p. 232), the divergent results highlight a
basíc problem of cross-country research: the data set ís small and
heterogeneous. Trading mechanisms in ínternational markets differ from one
another ín numerous aspects, so measuring the effect of círcuít breakers is
problematic.
The present research attempts to infer circuit breaker effectiveness by
studyíng a more homogeneous environment - the Tel Avív Stock Exchange. The
focus on a single exchange allows comparison of return and order imbalance
data of stocks that traded on crash day wíth stocks that díd not (i.e.,
stocks that had trade halts) in a relatively controlled fashion.S
II. Data
A. The Sample
The study uses stock return, order imbalance, and firm-characterístíc
data. Stock return and order Smbalance data are collected from the Official
Daily Quote Sheet published by the TASE. Data are daily for the period
October 13-28, 1987. This xide window ís designed to provide a relíable
descríption of stock behavior before, during, and after the crash.
In October 1987 250 dífferent company common stocks traded on the TASE.
Excluding stocks that were not on the maín líst of the exchange and stocks
that did not trade on at least three out of the ten tradíng days ín the
sample reduces the sample síze to 187. Where stocks trade in txo classes, we
use the one that traded at hígher volume in 1986.
The firm and stock characterístic data, xhich come from Meítav Stock
Guide or are derived from stock returns are: the size (total assets),
profítabílity (return on equíty), and book leverage of the firm, and the
beta and year-to-date gaín of the stock. The Appendix details the
defínitíons, measurement procedures, and averages of these variables. While
thís list of characterístícs is by no means exhaustive, we believe ít
suffíces to capture some important facets of behavíor duríng a crash.
B. Tradíng Mechanisms on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
Trade on the TASE is organized in three main stages: pre-auction,
auction, and post-auctíon. The first stage starts at 10:30 AM when exchange
members submít their own and the public's market and límit orders to the
exchange official. Thís start tíme gíves ínvestors an opportunity to submit
orders in the early morning hours.
Before 10:45 AM the exchange issues a"leader" detailíng the ínitial
excess demand or supply for each stock. This fígure is calculated by summing
all market orders with all límit orders that can be executed at the "basis"6
price. The "basis" price ís the prevíous-day closíng price on all days
except for ex-days. On ex-days (ex-dividend, ex-stock dívídend, or ex-rights
days), the "basis" price equals the prevíous-day closing price minus the
estímated value of the distributíon.
After the fírst "leader" publícation and up until 11:30 AM, the
exchange accepts only offsettíng orders, í.e., orders against the i nitíal
gap. Toward 11:30 AM the exchange publishes a second leader detailíng the
remaining supply and demand gaps. Thís updated ímbalance as published by the
exchange ín its officíal quote sheet ís the source of our order imbalance
data.
The second stage of trade ís the publíc auction. The auctioneer
announces the order imbalance ín stock A at the "basis" price and invites
exchange members and the public to submit orders against the gap. The
auctioneer then raiseslreduces stock A's príce (in steps of 0.25'I.) until
the imbalance ís completely offset.
If there is excess demand for stock A at the "basís" price of 100, for
example, the auctioneer raises its príce until the "sell" orders received
cover the entíre gap.2 The resulting price is called the auction closing
price, and all stock transactions are executed at that príce. That is, íf
the auction closing price of A ís 100.5, all transactions in A are executed
at the price of 100.5. Even if trader Z enters a sell order for A when the
auctíoneer tries a price of 100.25, Z's stock wiil be sold at the
equílibríum príce of 100.5.
The auction closing price ís the daily closing price for all but 25
stocks. (These 25 stocks are díscussed later.) Daily closing príces are
published ln the Offícíal Daíly Quote Sheet, and are the basís for return
calculations in thís study.
On occasíon, equilibríum ín the auction cannot be establíshed even at a
price change of 10'I.. In this instance, trade in the security is halted, the7
stock i s posted as "sellers only" or "buyers only," and none of the orders
submitted is executed. All orders in the stock are cancelled, and a príce
change of 5~ ís posted.
For example, i f excess demand for stock A ís not covered even at a
price of 110, the price of A is set at 105, and all orders submitted are
voided. Accordíng to the TASE regulation, a stock can be lísted as "sellers
only" or "buyers only" for no more than two consecutive days. After two
consecutive "buyers only" or "sellers only" days, an unlimited fluctuatíon
ín the stock price is allowed.
Following the public auction of all stocks, a thírd stage of trade
commences. This stage is limited to the Míshtanim stocks - a select group of
heavily traded stocks that on October 1987 included 25 stocks. During this
stage, bilateral transactions between exchange members take place at
variable prices. An official of the exchange announces whích Mishtanim stock
is to be traded, and then buy and sell offers are entered by the members.
Any member can accept any standing offer, and the exchange official records
the exact terms of each transactíon. Prices are variable. For example, if
member Z offers to sell 500 shares of stock B at 100.50 and member Y offers
to sell 1000 shares at 100.75, member X can buy 500 shares from Z at 100.50
and 500 shares from Y at 100.75.
The bílateral trading stage continues for up to two and a half hours,
and every few mínutes another stock trades. Most of the orders come from
large traders in the public who use exchange members as brokers, and usually
there are several rounds of trade in each of the Mishtaním stocks. The
closíng price of a Mishtaním stock as reported in the official quote sheet
is the average príce of the last three bilateral transactíons in the stock.
The total daily limit movement allowed ín a Míshtaním stock is 12~.8
III. Evidence on Panic Behavíor
A. The October 1987 Crash in Israel
Table I presents a few summary statístics on Israelí market activíty
and volatílíty around the crash. Unusual order imbalances and volumes of
trade are evident in the period 10I19I1987 through 10I25~1987, and abnormal
príce swíngs occured ín the períod 10I20I19B7 through 10I25~1987. Thus, the
ínstabílíty ín Israel started on October 19, 1987, a few hours before
the U.S. markets opened, and lasted for about a week.3
[Table I about here]
The average total loss of the TASE stocks during the crash week is
about 15'I.; their average October 1987 drop is about 18'I.. Thís declíne is
relatively modest by ínternational standards. In Roll's ( 1988) sample of 23
foreígn markets, the medlan October 1987 drop is 24'I.. ( The U.S. market lost
22'I.. )
B. Relative Order Imbalances Duríng the Crash
Analysis of relative order imbalances (see the Appendíx for exact
definitions and computatíon formulae) is a direct mean of ínvestígatíng
investor behavior in panic sítuatíons. Relative order ímbalances reveal
which securitíes the publíc dumped and at what íntensity.
Table II summarizes regressíons of relatíve order imbalances on síx
independent variables: síze, profitability, and leverage of the company, ~nd
beta, pre-crash gaín, and prevíous-day excess return of the stock. The most
ínteresting results appear on the crash day. On the crash day (October 20,
1987 in Israel), the coeffícients of beta and size are sígnificantly
negatíve, and the coeffícient of leverage is signíficantly positive.
(Table II about here]
Interpretation of the crash day results requires some care. Relative
order imbalance, the dependent variable in the regression, ís a sígned9
varíable (see the Appendíx). It is posítive in days of excess demand and
negative ín days of excess supply. October 20, 1987 was a day of
overwhelmíng excess supply. Thus, the negative coefficient of beta ín the
October 20 regressíon implíes that higher beta stocks had more negative
relatíve order imbalances, i.e., stronger excess supplies, on crash day.
Similarly, the negatíve coefficient of síze and posítive coefficient of
leverage lndicate that larger firm stocks and lower leverage firm stocks had
stronger supply pressures (more negative order imbalances) on crash day.
Varíous robustness tests confírm the fíndings of Table II.4 It appears
that ín addítior. to attempting to reduce theír systematíc risk, ínvestors
also fled on crash day from what seem to have been theír "better qualíty"
(larger fírm and lower leverage) stocks.
There are two possible interpretatíons of this phenomenon. Fírst, ít
mlght be that the paníckíng ínvestors held prímarily "solid" stocks. If
holders of speculative stocks are more tolerant of príce fluctuatíons than
holders of solíd stocks, the relatíve baíling out pressure ín the solid
stocks could be larger. This ís essentially a differential paníc hypothesís.
The alternatíve explanation ís the rational selling hypothesis. In
crash periods, investors attempt to sell theír better stocks because they
assume that their other stocks are likely to sell at a greater loss. This
pattern of behavíor ís particularly common for mutual funds trying to
accommodate large sudden redemptions.
Another ínterestíng day in the sample períod is October 25, 1987, when
sellíng pressures were concentrated in smaller-size and hígher-leverage
stocks. This pattern constitutes a partial reversal of the crash day
behavíor.
A revíex of the adjusted RZS ín Table II híghlíghts the unusual crash
behavior. On the days before and after the crash (October 13 through 19, and
October 26 through 28) adjusted Rzs are close to zero, indicatíng that stock10
characterístícs do not explaín order imbalances. On crash days, ln contrast,
adjusted RZS average 0.21.
C. Price Overreactíon and Return Reversal
Blume, MacKinlay, and Terker (1989) document price overreaction and
return reversal ín U.S. stocks duríng the crash. To test for these phenomena
ín our sample, we regress stock returns on beta, síze, cumulative gaín prior
to the crash, relative order lmbalance, and previous-day excess return. The
first four explanatory varíables describe the normal behavior of the stock,
while the last one measures the abnormal behavior.5 The price overreaction
and reversal hypothesis predícts that on the day followíng an overreactlon,
the coefficient of the prevíous-day excess return wíll be negatíve.
The results of the return regressíons (available from the authors)
document some evidence of price reversals. The coefflcient of the
previous-day excess return ís significantly negatíve (at the 5'I. level) in
the October 22, 1987 regressíon. Apparently, there were some overreaction
phenomena ín the first days of the crash.
The overreaction of Israelí stocks during the crash demonstrates that
even the established defensive mechanísms of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (an
"open" períod before trade for receipt of offsettíng orders, and a system of
circuít breakers) were not enough to prevent panic effects. The next section
examines the íssue of circuit breakers' effectíveness ín more detail.
IV. Evidence on Circuit Breakera
A. Can Circuít Breakers I?ampen Paníc Order Imbalances?
Panel A of Table III reports the mean relative order imbalances of
Israeli stocks on October 20 and 21, 1987. Three dífferent groups of stocks
are compared: stocks that díd not trade ( had trade halts) on crash day;
stocks that traded in the crash day auction only; and Mishtanim stocks,
which traded both i n the auction and in the bilateral tradíng stage.il
(Table III about here]
An ínterestíng fíndíng ls that stocks that traded on October 20 (groups
(B) and (C) in panel A) had a relatively low excess supply on October 21. On
October 21, the average excess supply of Mishtaním stocks (group (C) ) was
0.13 of their normal absolute order ímbalance; the average excess supply of
other stocks that traded on crash day (group (B)) was 0.36 of their normal
absolute imbalance. Both these Smbalances are insignificantly different from
zero, suggesting that between October 20 and 21, 1987 there was no ma,]or new
order ímbalance accumulation.
If the net imbalance generated between October 20 and October 21, 1987
is approximately zero, then the -1.48 relative order imbalance of
trade-halted stocks (group (A)) on October 21 acquires a special meaníng. It
represents the order imbalance that did not evaporate during the trade halt.
It appears that more than half of the ínítíal order imbalance on October 20
disappeared by the October 21 opening.6
The evídence of order imbalance narrowing ín stocks that had trade
halts does not necessaríly imply that trade halts per-se dampen panic order
ímbalances. Part of the observed 57~ declíne in order ímbalances is due to
the limít down price movement on October 20, 1987. At the lower opening
prices of October 21, there was naturally less excess supply.
Ne have estímated the excess supply narroxing that can be attríbuted to
the limít down príce movement by assessing the excess supply that can be
"covered" on a regular day (outside the crash period) by a one percent price
drop, and multipiyíng it by the limít-down return (for more detaíls see
Lauterbach and Ben-21on (1992)). According to these calculations the príce
decllne on crash day "tríggered" a 32'I. shrinkage in order imbalance. The
remaíning 25'I. declíne in order ímbalance ís unexplained and may indicate
some ameliorating effect of trade halts per-se.12
The problem with the above estímatíon procedure and ínference is that
crasr-period parameters are líkely to be dífferent than regular-day
parameters. Thus, it cannot be concluded wlth confidence that trade halts
contríbuted sígnificantly to the reduction ín order ímbalances.
B. Can Círcuít Breakers Moderate Panic Price Swings?
To examine trade-halt effects on the crash period príce swíngs, we
construct three return windows. The fírst wlndow includes the return on
October 20 and 21. All but eight stocks that did not trade on October 20
managed to trade on October 21. Thus, by October 21 the first ímmediate
reactíon to the crash was complete. The second window, which includes the
full crash period (October 20 through 25), is íntended to represent the
intermedíate (inítlal plus aftershocks) reaction. Fínally, the October 20
through 29 window seeks to measure the "long-term" persístent effect of the
crash.
Panel A of Table IV presents results of regressions of ímmediate-,
intermediate-, and overall-period returns on beta, size, pre-crash gain,
MISH-DUM (a trading dummy flagging the Mishtanim stocks), and TRAD-DUM (a
dummy variable flagging the non-Mishtanim stocks that traded on crash day).
The coefficíents of the Mishtanim tradíng dummy are sígnlficantly negatíve
in two out of the three return windows. Apparently, Mishtanim stocks
suffered a 5.1~ excess declíne ín the immedíate two-day wíndow, and a 2.5'I.
excess decline in the intermediate síx-day window. ,
Slmple comparísons of inean returns, summarízed in panel B, support this
conclusion. The Mishtanim group declined by 6.OI more than non-Mishtanim
stocks ín the immediate return períod, and by 4.6'I. more than non-Mishtaním
stocks in the íntermediate períod.
[Table IV about here]13
The longer-term perspective ís dífferent, however. Dwing the overall
wíndow Mishtanim and non-Míshtanim stock retwns are índístínguishable.
Panel B shous that in the overall period both groups lost 14.3'I. of their
value, and panel A documents that ín the long-term retwn regressions the
Mlshtanim trading dumu~y scored a statistically insignífícant coefflcient.
Thus, the Mishtanlm aberratíon seems to have evaporated within ten days.7
The results ín Table IV are suggestive. Apparently, the stocks that
traded more frequently and had larger supply presswes on the crash day
(Míshtanim stocks) overreacted by about 5~; and it took about ten days for
this initial overshooting to dísappear.
what caused the apparent overreaction of Mishtaním stock príces?
Perhaps a clue can be províded by addíng the relative order ímbalance on
October 20, 1987 as an índependent varíable to the ímmediate-term (October
20 through 21) regressíon of Table IV. If the aberratíon of Míshtanim stocks
was caused by theír relatively large excess supply presswes, then the
coefficient of the October 20 relatíve order ímbalance should be
sígnificantly different from zero, and the coefficient of MISH DUM should
become insígnificantly dífferent from zero.
Fitting the above expanded model, it was found that the coeffícient of
the October 20 relative order ímbalance is 0.0014 wíth a t-value of 0.3, and
the coeffícient of MISH-DUM ís -0.049 with a t-statístic of -5.7. It thus
appears that the Míshtanlm stocks uníque dip on the fírst days of the crash
cannot be explaíned by their stronger supply presswes.
The second trading dummy examíned in Table IV, TRAD-DUM, identífies the
non-Mishtanim stocks that traded on crash day. It is diffícult to draw
conclusíons based on thís subsample because it includes stocks that were
relatively "favorites" at the tíme. Panel A of Table III shows that the
group of non-Mishtanim stocks which traded on crash-day experíenced less14
sellíng pressure to begín wíth, and panel B of Table IV shows thís group
overall crash decline to be the least severe.
Nevertheless, the pattern of reaction of non-Mishtanim stocks that
traded on crash-day is instructive. The dlfference between the immedíate
two-day and the overall crash-períod reactions of these stocks ís less than
1'I.. Stocks traded via single daily auctions ( non-Míshtanim stocks) appear to
have overreacted less than the "contínuously traded" Mishtania stocks. Thís
fíndíng ís consistent with Roll's ( 1988) observation that in panics
continuous trading and sharper price declines coincide. Roll's píthy
conclusíon ís that "perhaps haste made waste in October 1987 ( 1988, p. 33)."
V. St~mery and Concluaions
Trading mechanisms on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange allow investígatíon
of the net effect of círcuit breakers and direct examination of officíal
order ímbalance data.
The main fínding of the order imbalance analysis ís that on October
1987 sell pressures ín Israel were concentrated ín hígher beta, larger
company, and lower leverage stocks. This evídence is somewhat surprisíng
because smaller firms and higher leverage stocks might be expected to be
dumped first in times of crisis. Traders may have concluded that less solid
stocks had a good chance of selling at an ínferior price.
The examínatíon of circuit breakers ylelded two Smportant results.
First, trading halts and price limits had no ímpact on the overall declíne,
but merely smoothed return fluctuatlons in the neighborhood of Lhe crash.8
Second, there are some weak indícatíons that the trade halt helped cut the
supply gap. According to our estimates, the drop in excess supply of
trade-halted stocks between October 20 and 21, 1987 cannot be fully
explaíned by the prlce drop.15
The optimal mix between a contínuous-trade system and a clrcult breaker
system ís mainly an ínvestor service íssue. Regulatory agencies looking for
an optimal tradíng system should weigh the hedge against executíon price
surpríses that circuit breakers províde versus the liquidity advantage of
free trading. It ís possible that a specíal crash-períod trading system that
organizes a limíted number of auctions on crash day and requires all orders
submítted to these auctions to be límít orders could satisfy most market
partícipants and prove socíally beneficial.16
Appendiz: Sowces and Calculation Methods of the Empirical Variables
A.1. Betaí - Beta of the Stock
The beta of stock i is estlmated by running a market model regressíon on
daily retwns in the period 6~1I1987 - 10~12~1987. The market index employed
ls the value-weighted índex of all TASE stocks published daily by the
Tel-Avív Stock Exchange and the Israelí Central Bureau of Statístics.
A.2. CAIN1 - Pre-Crash Gain of the Stock
GAINí ís measwed as stock 1's retwn in the period 1~1~1987 - 10I12I1987.
Average pre-crash gaín is 31.3~.
A.3. LEV1 - Fínancial Leverage of the Firm
LEV1 is defined as total debt dívided by total equíty (both ín book value).
Total debt and total equity fígures come from Meítav Stock Guíde 12I86
balance sheet informatíon. Average leverage is 4.5.
A.9. PROF1 - Profítabílity of the Fírm
PROF1 ís defíned as net profit divided by book value of total equity. Both
net profit and total equity fígwes are as of 12I86 and are collected from
Meitav Stock Guíde. The average profitabílíty of the sample firms ís 7.1'I..
A.5. RIMBTI - Relative Order Imbalance of the Stock
The TASE publishes daily the pre-trade order lmbalance for each stock. (It
ís customary to report excesses Sn demand as positíve numbers and excesses
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Where IMBTi ís the reported order ímbalance of stock i on day T, and the
denominator is the average absolute order ímbalance of stock i dwíng the17
sample period (10~13I1987 to 10~28I1987). RIt~BTi essentially standardízes
the order i mbalance on day T by the average absolute magnitude of order
ímbalance. Note that the sígn of RIt~Tí is determined by the sign of the
order ímbalance of stock i on day t. If stock 1 ís ín excess supply on day t
RI1~T1 ís negative.
A.6. RT1 - Return of the Stock
RT1, the return of stock í on day T, is calculated from daily quote sheets
of the TASE as ln (closing price of stock i on day T I closing price of
stock 1 on day T-1). Returns are adjusted for splíts and dlvídends.
A.7. SIZE1 - Firm Size
The size of firm i is measured as ln (total assets of firm í on 12I1986 in
millíons of U.S. dollars). Meitav Stock Guide is the source of the data.
Average SI7.E1 is 3.2, índicatíng an average book value of total assets of
825 million approximately.
A.8. UR(T-1)1 - Prevíous Day Excess Return
The previous day excess return of stock i is approximated by the resídual of
the cross-sectíonal regression of R(T-1)1 on BETAí and SIZ.E1, i.e.,
R(T-1)í - a~ t a~BETA1 } azSIZEí t UR(T-1)1 . (A.2)
The basic assumption ís that beta and size determine the normal return of
the stock, so the residual is the abnormal or "excess" return of the stock.18
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FOOTNOTES
1 Grossman (1989, p. 7) defines panlc as a situatíon where a large fraction
of equíty holders try to reduce theír equity exposure at the same time
(after observíng a fall ín príce).
2 Offsettíng orders arrive from three maín sources: 1) exchange members
trading on their own account; 2) exchange members actíng as the public's
brokers - the auction progress ís transmítted "líve" to subscribers of the
"Kav Manhe" computer communication network, and max~y large ínvestors who
watch the auctíon submlt orders ín real tíme by callíng the offices of an
exchange member representatíve; and 3) límlt orders - the TASE computer
updates the auctíoneer about relevant executionable límit orders every time
the auctioneer changes the price.
3 Because of tíme-zone differences, the TASE was closed when the NYSE opened
on October 19, 1987. Thus, the main Israeli response to Hlack Monday
occurred on October 20, 1987.
4 The results ín Table II are robust to exclusíon of outlíers. In addition,
tests of multícolínearíty and normality do not reveai aqy significant
deviatíons from OIS assumptíons.
5 The purpose of the four "normal behavior" variables is to reduce residual
variance, so that the effect of the main variable, previous-day excéss
return, can be monitored more clearly.
Of the four variables representíng the normal cross-sectional variation
of stock returns, two (beta and size) are customary in financial economícs
(see Banz (1981), for example). The thírd, pre-crash gaín of the stock, is a
less standard varíable, which we ínclude for íts dual explanatory power.
First, it proxies for the average return of each stock, which might be21
useful íf beta and size cannot capture all cross-sectional varíation ín
expected returns. Second, it controls for the possibllity that the crash was
the bursting of a bubble (see Hardouvelís (1990), for example).
The fourth explanatory variable, pre-auction relative order imbalance,
proxíes for the information that arrived for each stock since the
prevíous-day close. The coeffícients of relatíve order imbalance are
posítíve and híghly sígnífícant in all sample days, indicatíng that better
news typically leads to larger excess demand and hígher price advances. The
fínding of posítive coeffícients of relatíve order ímbalance in the return
regressions can also be interpreted as evidence of price overreactíon to
supply or demand pressures. However, given the fact that the return order
imbalance relation ís strong for all sample days (both ínside and outside
the crash períod), it seems preferable to consider relative order imbalance
as a normal behavior varíable.
6 Panel B of Table III elaborates the mean order ímbalance comparison by
controlling for stock characterístics. A multíple regression of relative
order imbalance on four independent variables uas run. The independent
variables included the three stock characterístics found sígnificant in the
Table II regressions (beta, size, and leverage), and a new variable -
HALT-DUM. HALT-DUM is a dummy variable for the stocks that did not trade on
crash-day even after a límít down movement (123 stocks).
The results of the regressíons ín panel B support the previous
conclusions. In partícular, the coefficient of HALT-DUM in the October 21
regressíon (-1.34) indicates that stocks that did not trade on October 20
had an"unexplained" excess supply on October 21 equal to about 1.34 tímes
their average absolute order imbalance. If this excess supply is a
reasonable estímate of the excess supply left over from October 20, then
order imbalance dimínished by about 60'I. between October 20 and 21.zz
7 A potential problem with the comparisons ín Table IV is that Míshtanim and
non-Míshtanim stock return data are non-synchronous. Míshtaním stocks trade
for longer hours; their October 20 through 21 return, for example, also
íncludes the return on October 21 after non-Mishtanlm stocks had closed.
Data about the extra-hours (bilateral tradíng stage) return of
Míshtanim stocks are avallabie ln the Officíal Daily Quote Sheet. Analysis
reveals that aqy distortion íntroduced by the non-synchronization problem is
relatively small. The average Mishtanim stock return in the bílateral
trading stage is -0.57~, 0.48~, -0.13~, and 0~ on October 19, 21, 2S, and
29, respectívely.
8 It is notewort that the smoothed ~Y príces generated by a circuít breaker
process are not necessarlly less effícient than unrestricted trade príces.
If, duríng the crash, prices of freely traded stocks fluctuate around the
full-information equilíbrium prices ( because of liquídity constraints and
less intervention by ratíonal agents), then smoothíng the price path by
means, of trade halts and single auctions need not necessarily yield a more
biased príce trajectory.Table I
Summary Description of the October 1987
Crash in Israel
Trading Value-Weighted Total Volume Number of Number of
Date' Stock Market (in S Million) Stocks with Stocks with
Return (in oIo)~ Excess Demand` Excess Supply`
(as of market opening) (as of market opening)
Oct. 13 2.4 5.9 122 53
Oct. 18 0.2 11.2 84 g7
Oct. 19 -2.2 26.4 25 156
Oct. 20 -8.5 51.9 2 185
Oct. 21 -5.7 20.3 30 154
Oct. 22 4.5 17.6 164 21
Oct. 25 -5.6 19.9 4 182
Oct. 28 -1.1 13.6 62 117
Oct. 27 1.7 14.5 110 63
Oct. 28 0.7 11.9 93 90
' The exchange was closed October 14 through 17 !or a holiday and on October 23 and 24 (the
weekend).
6 Market return and total volume statistics are from the Official Quote Sheet of the Tel Aviv
Stock Exchange.
` The number of stocks in the sample is 187, but not all opened for trade every day. (T~ade
halts because of major firm-specific information releases aze also customary.) Hence, the sum
o! the exces9 demand and excess supply columns is less than 187.Table II
Regressions of Order Imbalances on Firm and Stock Characteristics
Around the October 1987 Crash in Israel
RIMBT, - ao t ai BETA; t az SIZE; t a~ LEV, t a~ PROF;
f as GAI,V; ~ a6 UR(T - 1); t cT'
Ttading Coef6cíents (t - statistiw in parentheses)y Adj. Number of
Date ao at az a3 a~ as aa Rz Observations`
Oct. 13 -.O6 31 -.024 .0033 -.0009 078 -2.3
(-0.4) (2.4) (-1.1) (0.9) (-0.8) (1.9) (-1.2) .04 169
Oct. 18 .17 -.21 008 0008 .0009 O56 -1.7
(1.0) (-1.5) (0.4) (0.4) (1.5) (1.6) (-1.3) .00 169
Oct. 19 -.30 -.O1 -.009 -.0004 .0002 001 -2.9
(-2.2) (-o.l) (-0.5) (-o.l) (o.l) (o.o) (-2.3) .o0 172
Oct. 20 -1.03 -1.22 -.465 .0314 -.0045 .019 -4.0
(-3.7) (-4.7) (-8.2) (4.4) (-1.7) (0.1) (-1.4) .38 177
Oct. 224~' .96 .17 -.015 .0032 .0006 -.059 -7.2
(4.1) (0.8) (-0.3) (0.B) (0.4) (-0.9) (-4.8) .12 175
Oct. 25 -1.02 -.49 .143 -.0103 -.0025 .006 4.7
(-5.9) (-3.2) (3.8) (-2.3) (-1.7) (0.1) (2.B) .12 178
Oct. 26 -.59 35 .020 .0055 .0004 -.033 0.6
(-1.9) (1.6) (0.5) (1.5) (0.1) (-0.4) (0.3) 00 165
Oct. 27 .04 25 -.002 .0025 -.0005 . 150 0.8
(0.1) (1.3) (-0.0) (0.5) (-0.3) (1.9) (0.4) -.O1 163
Oct. 28 .27 -.16 -.014 .0002 -.0008 .069 -2.8
(1.2) (-0.9) (-0.4) (0.1) (-0.8) (1.5) (-1.7) -.O1 165
" RIMBT; is the relative order imbalance ofstock i on day T; BETA; is the beta of the stock;
SIZE;, LEI; and PROF, are measures of firm i's size, financial leverage and profitability;
GAIN; is the return of stock i from 12~31~86 to 10~12~87, and UR(T - 1); is the previous
day "excess" return on the stock. More details on the variables are provided in the Append'u.
b Standard errors are corrected for heteroacedasticity using White's (1980) method.
` The number of observations is less than 187 (the number oC firms in the sample) because of
exclusion of: 1) stocks that did noc open for trading on that date because of major fitm-
specific news releases; 2) stocks that did not trade on the previous trading date; and 3) two
firms for whieh the PROF, information is meaningless. (These two firms had negative equity
in their 1986 balance sheets.)
a October 21 is omitted because of the potentially distorted sample on that date. About two-
thirds of the stocks did not trade on October 20; hence the October 21 order imbalances aze
contaminated, in most of the stocks, by the October 20 imbalances. A detailed analysis of
the October 21 behavior is provided in Table III.
` In the October 22 regression, UR(T - 1); is the excess return on the stock in the two-day
interval 10~20-10~21,1987.Table III
The Effect of Circuit Breakers on Order Imbalances
During the October 1987 Crash in Israel
A Comparison of the Order Imbalances of Stocks That
Did Not Trade, Stocks That Traded ~equently, and
Stocks That Traded Lightly on Crash Day
Panel A: Comparisons of Mean R.elative Order Imbalances
Subsample
Mean Relative Order Imbalance On
ctober 20 October 21 t-statistic
(Number of Observations in Parentheses) of Difference"
(A) Stocks tha.t did not trade -3.46 -1.48
on crash day even after (123) (122)
a limit-down movement
(B) Stocks that traded in the -2.64 -0.36
crash day auction~ (39) (38)
(C) Mishtanim stocks` -5.24 -0.13
(25) (25)
t-statistics of (A)-(C)" 9.4 -9.3
t-statistiw of (A)-(B)' -3.3 -4.9




Panel B: Regression Results
RIbIBT, - ko f kl BETA; f kZ SIZE; t k3 LEY f k~ HALTI7UM; ~- pT a
Trading Date Coefficients of (t-statistics in parentheses)' Adj. Number of
BETA [ZE LEV HAL -DUM R~ Observations
October 201 -1.22 -.482 .0334 -.18 .38 187
(-5.1) (-7.9) (4.4) (-0.9)
October 219 0.75 -.095 0043 -1.34 .28 185
(3.4) (-1.3) (0.4) (-6.9)
' t-statistics are calculated as R, -R,
~~ s~
~t}7j
number of observations in sample 1.
Not including Mishtanim stocks.
where Xl, Si and Nl are the mean, variance and
Mishtanim stocks include a select group ofstocks that trade longer hours and more frequently.
(See Section II.B Cor more details.)
RIMBT, is the relative order imbalance of stock i on day T; BETA; is ehe beta of the stock;
SIZE; and LEI; are measures of firm i's size and financial leverage; and HALT-DUM; is a
trading dummy. HALT~UM equals 1 for all stocks that had trade halts on crash day and
equals 0 otherwise.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's (1980) method.
The regression coefiicients and t-scores remain almost identical upon omission of stocks that
did not trade on October 19, 1987.
The number of observations on October 21 is less than 187 (the number of firms in the
sample) because of two stocks that released major news and did not open for trading on that
date.Table IV
The Effect of Circuit Breakers oa Stock Returns
During the October 1987 Crash in Israel:
A Comparison of the Returns of Stocks That Did
Not Trade, Stocks That Traded iï~equently and
Stocks That Traded Lightly on Crash Day
Panel A: Regressioa Results
RTi,T~, - Ko t Kl BETA~ t Kz SlZE; t K3 CAIN;
t K4TRAD-IJUM; f Ks MISH-DUM; f~; "
Ttading Interval Coefticients o( (t-statistics in parentheses)~ Adj. Number of
TRADI~UM MISH-DUhf R~ Observations~
Oct. 20-Oct. 21 015 -.051 .14 187
(1.4) (-7.0)
Oct. 20-0ct. 25 .022 -.025 .13 187
(1.7) (-2.7)
Oct.20-Oct.29 037 -.011 .02 187
(1.7) (-0.6)Table IV (Cont.)
Panel B: Mean Return Comparisons
Mean Return in the Interval
Subsample
10~20-10~21 10~20-10~25 10~20-10~29 Observations
~íishtanim stocks -18.SoJo -19.2oIo -14.3oIo 25
Non-Mishtanim stocks -12.5010 -14.6oïo -14.3010 162
t-statistic of
differencea -10.6 -6.3 0.0
Non-Mishtanim stocks
that did not trade on
crash day even after a
limit-down movement -12.9010 -15.20l0 -15.Oolo 123
Non-Mishtanim stocks
that traded in the
crasó day auction -11.3010 -12.4010 -12.Oolo 39
t-statistic of
differenced -1.4 -2.1 -1.5
' RTiTz, is the cumulative return of stock i in days Tr through T~; BETA; is the beta of the
stock; SIZE; is a measure of firm i's size; GAIN; is the return o[ stock i from 12~31~8fi
to 10~12~87, and TRAD-DUM; and MISH-DUM, are trading dummies. MISH-DUM
equals 1 for all stocks that had more than one trading round on the crash day (bíishtanim
stocks), and equals 0 for all other stocks. TRAD-DUM equals 1 for all stocks that had
exactly one trading round on crash day, and equals zero otherwise.
~ Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's ( 1980) method.
` When stocks that did not trade on October 19, 21, 25, or 29 are excluded from the corre-
sponding regressions, the coefEcients and t-scores of MISH~UM remain almost the same,
while the coef5cients of TRAD-IJUM increase by 0.01 on average and become statistically
significant (t-values of 2.2-2.4).
d t-statistic9 are calculated as A5~R5~ where Xi, Si and Nl aze the mean, vaziance and
~}~
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